Braingrass

Stupidity

2011-08-15T13:43:00.003+02:00

Perhaps you should only think where you are the most stupid, for only there are the most interesting problems going to lie for you. 'Interesting', because you don't know the answer to them. Of course your stupidity is a very personal matter. One person's stupidity can be an embarrassment for another, but for them it might be their hidden strength. 'Why are you being so stupid,' they might irritatingly remark, 'can you not see the answer to the question?' But your relation to your own stupidity is a far different affair. It is not enough that you are stupid, as seen from the position of the other, you have to feel your own stupidity. This means that you know there is something missing in your response. My stupidity lies with entirely within the word 'God'. I do not understand why people believe in God, but at the same time, my absence of belief seems entirely stupid to me. I don't have the insouciance of those who quite happily call themselves atheists. I don't know what it means. I have more time for those who think the entire discussion is useless, that you shouldn't talk about God at all, whether you believe in Him or not, than those who either assert his existence or don't. For example, when Jean Luc Marion defends himself in his preface to the English translation of God without Being against the theologians that he didn't mean that God did not exist and that He certainly does, I find his ability to simply pronounce that God exists entirely baffling (I know his book explains why he can say that, but it doesn't help me). At the same time, militant atheists like Dawkins and his ilk, are entirely laughable. They haven't even read Kant or Nietzsche. It's as though we have been transported in a time machine to the 17th C, and yet the proclaim themselves to the most up to date, the most modern, knights of reason against the oncoming hoards of irrational believers, be they Christian, Muslim or whatever.

The History of God

2011-04-08T08:54:00.007+02:00

You imagine writing a history of God. Not a history of religion, nor even a mythical person (if you can speak like that), but of a philosophical concept. You see this history as the story of a disappearance. The more philosophical, the more rational, the concept of God becomes, the more God actually vanishes to become finally nothing more than a thin vapour and then nothing. The truth of the philosophical concept of God is atheism. You think then that Nietzsche's famous 'Death of God' is not outside this history but its proper culmination. And yet, after all this, when this history comes to an end, something remains. It is this remainder that interests you. Nonetheless, it still seems absurd that anyone would write about this now. What possible reason would there be to write a philosophy of religion today? Your only reply is that it is in the face of the question of God that you feel the most stupid and inadequate. Your own atheism is a paltry thing in comparison.

The Infinite and the Indefinite

2011-01-27T09:44:00.007+01:00

You need to distinguish between the indefinite and the infinite. The indefinite is the bad infinite. It is the infinite of capitalism, the endless repetition of the present. What is the other infinite? It is the infinite as the emptying of the future into the present, the explosion of time. As though water would flow back into a pouring vessel until it bursts.

In the indefinite, the future is merely what persists. It is the endless repetition of the present without change or difference. The infinite future, on the other hand, is the creative power of the present. The present as a productive ontological power; the new, as opposed to the endless repetition of the same.

You need to distinguish between fate and redemption. Fate is synonymous with cynicism. Dead time and cynicism belong together. Time is at the heart of all moods. The time of cynicism is the endless repetition of the present. What will happen has already happened and will happen again. This is why it is fatalistic. Why bother with anything since it has already happened. The difference between fate and redemption is both one of time and moods. The time of redemption is one of the future to come, as opposed to the endless dead repetition of the present, and its mood is one of hope, rather than cynicism.

Capitalism and Life

2010-10-29T10:49:00.004+02:00

On the one hand, the time of life, and on the other, the time of capital, though this is not a dialectical opposition. Capital does not rise out of life and transcend it, but is always immanent to life. It distorts this relation by making itself appear as though it were the origin of life. Thus the businessman thinks without him there would be no life, whereas in fact it is he who is the parasite. Today we see this thinking everywhere. We cannot think of life except as the result of economic necessity. 'There is no alternative,' they say over and over again. The absence of possibilities is the end of life, for life is the possible and nothing else.

Two Futures

2010-09-03T10:04:00.007+02:00

Begin with the two futures: the future of capital - the Futures Market and Messianic future - these are two very different temporalities. What conceptions of time are hidden there - the future of capital is the endless repetition of the same - the same instant again and again. The future of the Messianic is the interruption of the present by the future - the interruption of time - but the endless future of capital (which is its particular form of secular redemption) isn't really a future at all, but merely hides the real future which is the future of the disaster - human and natural catastrophe.

Messianic Prophetism

2010-07-06T11:45:00.007+02:00

Religion as redemption that is what interests me and not as a belief in a world beyond this world. What are the resources of a language of redemption still left within religion? How do I measure the world against the possibility of justice for all and not just for the few?

Time is a Relation

2010-03-17T12:07:00.007+01:00

The present contains within itself the past, and is pregnant with the future.

Cassier

The elements of time (past, present and future) are not counter-posed to one another as though they were hermetically sealed segments on an infinite line. Rather than the past and the future being opposed to the present from the outside, they are contained in the present. They are part of the present, however, only as excessive. Both the possibilities of the past and the future exceed what has been actualised in the present. What could have been is always greater than what has been, and events of the past can announce the possibility of a different future.

The past and the future are virtual in relation to the present. This means that their real possibilities are not determined in advance by the actuality of the present. This is why the real future, as opposed to the endless repetition of the present, is always a surprise.

Kant's Antinomies

2010-02-09T20:43:00.009+01:00

A good place to start is Kant's antinomies. Basically they are lesson in what goes wrong if you start with the common sense view of reality and then apply it to experience, rather than applying experience to our perception of things. Take the idea of the world. The antinomy is that either in the world every substance is simple or composite, and every composite substance is composed of parts, or there are no composite substances consisting of parts and everything is simple. The solution to this antinomy, as we know, is not to show that one view is false and the other not, but that contained in both is a reification of the idea of the world. The world as a whole is not something that I can experience either as a simple or composite, because it is not a substance at all, but an idea. But if the world is an idea, what kind of idea is it? It is not an idea as essence (as it would be in Plato), but a relation. It precedes the experience of things as such. Each thing I experience is related to another thing and so on, and without this network I would not be able to experience any individual thing, but it itself is not a thing, nor could it ever be a thing. It is the non-perceptible openness in which each thing exists, suspended beyond itself in reaching out to another infinitely. I do not know the world, if you mean by know, experience some thing, rather I have to be it.

God

2010-02-01T11:02:00.006+01:00

God is not a thing, being or substance. But nor is God an idea, thought, or consciousness. God is first of all a relation. From this relation, we might then think of things and ideas, but first of all we have to think of the relation on its own terms. But what does it mean to think of the relation first of all? It means that we have to start with the relation and not the terms of the relation. Or, the terms are an effect and not the cause of the relation. The relation is a condition of the terms of the relation and not the other way around.

God is not a thing. This is what Kant teaches us. But what does it mean to say beyond Kant that God is not an idea? This is what I am trying to answer when I say that God is a relation. Neither dogmatic nor transcendental metaphysics; you have to pick your way between these two.

In the Beginning is the Relation

2010-01-30T15:16:00.010+01:00

In the beginning is the relation, not the word or the deed. There is no thing that is given first of all without context, relation or function. Without these, I could not experience or perceive anything, but they are not themselves perceptible. This does not mean they are pure ideas floating above experience. Experience is neither real nor ideal, but an admixture of both. What is ideal is real; what is real is ideal. This is why the old divisions between idealism and materialism, or rationalism and empiricism, no longer make sense.